




Equality Opportunity: Marriage Litigation 
and Iowa’s Equal Protection Law 
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sarah Hinger, & Keren Zwick* 
Discrimination claims against longstanding rules invite the public and 
the courts to rethink the status quo and address overarching legal and social 
commitments to equality together with questions specific to the case at 
hand.1 Lawsuits seeking marriage rights for same-sex couples 
quintessentially illustrate this multilayered nature of law reform litigation, 
as the debates they provoke focus not only on the rights of same-sex couples 
but also on the meaning of marriage and the meaning of equality more 
generally. While few other than lawyers, judges, and perhaps some reporters 
 
* Suzanne B. Goldberg is Clinical Professor and Director of the Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic at 
Columbia Law School.  Sarah Hinger and Keren Zwick, both Columbia Law School Class of 2009, 
were students in the Clinic and co-authors of the amicus brief that is this essay's focus, along with 
Katherine L. Harris and Sadie R. Holzman, also Columbia Law School Class of 2009. 
 1.  Historically, this link between law reform litigation and social change has been most 
apparent in connection with challenges to race and sex discrimination in schools and at work. See, 
e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting racial segregation in education); United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (invalidating sex-based admissions rule); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (rejecting military’s sex-based employment benefits rule). While 
these cases sought direct change in areas of education and employment, they also expanded equality 
jurisprudence and, arguably, strengthened social commitments to end race and sex stereotyping. 
Numerous scholars have commented on the role of litigation in these social movements. As Robert 
C. Post has observed, “constitutional law and culture are locked in a dialectical relationship, so that 
constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture.” The Supreme Court, 2002 Term––
Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 
(2003); see also Robert C. Post and Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and 
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007) (discussing the relationship between 
developments in constitutional law and cultural politics regarding abortion); William N. Eskridge 
Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth 
Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002) (arguing that most changes in later twentieth-century 
constitutional doctrine responded to identity-based social movements); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, 
Elites, Social Movements and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 
(2005) (addressing recent U.S. Supreme Court affirmative action cases and analyzing the role of 
legal action in mobilizing social movements). Public discourse surrounding the cases brought by 
Guantanamo Bay detainees provides another contemporary example of the relationship between 
litigation and broader social change. While constitutional challenges to the detentions may help 
focus attention on the detentions specifically, the public debate ultimately involves a wider-ranging 
exploration of American culture and values than the due process questions in the case reach. See, 
e.g., Almerindo Ojeda, Op-Ed., Guantanamo Bay and the Betrayal of American Values, S.F. 
CHRON., June 17, 2008, at B7, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/ 
06/17/EDOQ11A397.DTL; Mark H. Buzby, Op-Ed., Guantanamo is a Model Prison (Really), 
WALL ST. J., June 4, 2008, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB121253762342343273.html?mod=relevancy. 
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actually read the equal protection and due process arguments that the 
presiding court will consider, many community members where marriage 
litigation is taking place become fully engaged in debating the equality and 
fundamental rights questions implicated by the legal claims.2  
This degree of popular attention certainly exists in Iowa, where talk of 
gay couples marrying took center stage even before a lawsuit was filed in 
the Iowa district court in 2005.3 The suit, which was brought by six lesbian 
and gay couples and eventually joined by some of the couples’ children,4 is 
one of many marriage equality suits to be filed in recent years5 and is the 
first to be filed in the Midwest.  
Yet while the public debate may be wide-ranging, it typically misses 
the ways in which the lawsuit may have long-term consequences for a 
state’s equality jurisprudence that extend well beyond marriage.6 In Iowa, 
 
 2. For example, as California’s marriage cases worked their way through state courts, the 
L.A. Times ran a weeklong series of conversations in its on-line edition covering the various facets 
of the debate over equal marriage rights. See, e.g., Ron Prentice and Lorri L. Jean, Op-Ed., Dust-
Up: Golden State, Same-Sex Marriages, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 2007, http://www.latimes.com/news/ 
opinion/la-op-dustup30jul30,0,6536452.story. Public conversation often continues even after a state 
high court hands down its ruling. In Massachusetts, for example, after the state Supreme Judicial 
Court ruled in favor of marriage equality, opponents of marriage rights for same-sex couples 
continued to challenge the ruling’s legal and social force. See Katie Zezima, Vote on Same-Sex 
Marriage is Delayed in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2006 at A16, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/ 13/us/13gay.html#. 
 3. In March of 2004, about nine months before the Varnum litigation was filed, forty same-
sex couples, accompanied by supporters, attempted to obtain marriage licenses in Johnson County, 
Iowa. See Christina Preiss, Wedding Bells Don’t Chime for 40 Same-Sex Couples, THE DAILY 
IOWAN, Mar. 1, 2004, available at http://media.www.dailyiowan.com/media/storage/paper599/ 
news/2004/03/01/Metro/Wedding.Bells.Dont.Chime.For.40.SameSex.Couples-622242.shtml. At the 
same time, the Iowa Senate rejected a resolution to place an amendment prohibiting same-sex 
couples from marrying on the ballot. See S.J. Res. 2002, 80th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Iowa as 
defeated Mar. 23, 2004). 
 4. Amended Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Supplemental Injunctive and Mandamus 
Relief, Varnum v. Brien, No. CV5965 (Iowa Dist. Aug. 30, 2006), 2006 WL 4803848. 
 5. For cases in which courts have ruled in the plaintiff couples’ favor, see Kerrigan v. 
Comm’r of Pub. Health, No. 17716, 2008 WL 4530885 (Conn. Oct. 28, 2008) (holding that the state 
constitution requires equal access to marriage for same and opposite sex couples); In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (same); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 
2003) (same); Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Circ. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) 
(same); cf. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the Vermont Constitution requires 
the state to provide the benefits of marriage equally to same- and different-sex couples). Other 
courts have upheld the denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples under their respective state 
constitutions. See, e.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006); Hernandez v. 
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); 
Standhardt v. Superior Ct., 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
 6.  Although most marriage litigation has involved state constitutional claims, questions of 
marriage equality for same-sex couples have been addressed at the federal level as well. The 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)—signed into law on September 21, 1996, in the midst of the 
state constitutional marriage litigation in Hawaii— provides that the federal government will not 
recognize same-sex couples’ marriages. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). Some U.S. 
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specifically, while Varnum v. Brien focuses directly on marriage equality, 
the case also engages an ongoing conversation among the state’s courts 
about how Iowa’s equality guarantees should be enforced. 
This essay introduces an amicus brief filed with the Iowa Supreme 
Court on behalf of three Iowa constitutional law scholars that addresses 
these broad questions about the future of Iowa equal protection law.7 In 
publishing the brief with the University of Iowa College of Law’s Journal 
of Gender, Race & Justice, we aim to show why, both in Iowa and around 
the country, courts would be better off embracing a single standard of equal 
protection review rather than the ossified and often ineffective federal tiered 
approach.8 By highlighting the brief’s implications for issues beyond 
marriage, we also aim to illustrate the point that law reform litigation, 
especially regarding contested social issues, often implicates not only the 
specific claim before the court but also other far-reaching questions about 
the jurisprudential status quo. 
The question that is the brief’s focus—whether the federal approach to 
equal protection review is the ideal means of enforcing the equality 
guarantee—has been the subject of debate for some time, not only in Iowa 
but also in other states, in the academic literature, and in the United States 
Supreme Court.9 As every law student learns, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
evolved a tiered framework for equal protection claims.10 Through this 
framework, courts typically impose rigorous scrutiny on a small set of 
classifications (race, alienage, national origin, sex, and non-marital 
 
Supreme Court Justices have weighed in as well. In their respective opinions in Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003), Justices O’Connor and Scalia came to differing conclusions regarding the 
viability of restrictive marriage laws under federal equality jurisprudence. Justice O’Connor 
suggested that the laws excluding same-sex couples from marriage could be upheld because 
“preserving the traditional institution of marriage” would amount to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 
585 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). By contrast, Justice Scalia observed that the 
rejection of a morals-based rationale at issue in Lawrence would lead logically to the recognition of 
equal marriage rights. Id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 7. The scholars include Robert C. Hunter of Drake University School of Law, Jean C. Love, 
currently on the Santa Clara University School of Law faculty and formerly a professor at the 
University of Iowa College of Law, and Maura Strassberg of Drake University School of Law. 
Professor Suzanne B. Goldberg and students in the Columbia Law School Sexuality & Gender Law 
Clinic, Katherine L. Harris, Sarah Hinger, Sadie R. Holzman, and Keren Zwick authored the brief. 
Local counsel, David H. Goldman, Brent A. Cashatt, and Kodi A. Peterson of Babich, Goldman, 
Cashatt, and & Renzo, P.C., also assisted with the brief. 
 8. See infra notes 11–19 and accompanying text. This argument is further developed in Part 
II.A. of the accompanying amicus brief. 
 9.  See infra notes 16–19, 26–29. 
 10. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
668–791 (3d ed. 2006) (summarizing the development of tiered equal protection analysis in case 
law). 
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parentage).11 The result of this stratified approach is that although suspect 
and quasi-suspect classifications receive careful review, many other forms 
of government line-drawing receive little more than a judicial rubber stamp. 
So, for example, courts have sustained distinctions based on age,12 mental 
capacity,13 sexual orientation,14 and other characteristics over strong 
dissents that the distinctions are either arbitrary or bias-infected.15  
Even in its early years, the tiered framework drew disagreement from 
Justice Marshall, who condemned the Court for adhering to a “rigid two-tier 
model” after it had “apparently lost interest in recognizing further 
‘fundamental’ rights and ‘suspect’ classes.”16 Then-Justice Rehnquist also 
disparaged the approach, describing it as “a series of conclusions 
unsupported by any central guiding principle.”17 Academic commentators 
have criticized the tiers for functioning like barriers to equality18 and 
creating a situation in which cases subject to rational basis review are 
 
 11.  Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 481, 496–503 (2004). 
 12.  See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (upholding a statute 
establishing age fifty as the mandatory retirement age for uniformed police officers). 
 13.  See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (finding Kentucky’s statutory procedures 
for involuntary civil commitment based on mental retardation valid under rational basis review). 
 14.  See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec. of Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 
2004), reh’g en banc denied by 377 F.3d 1275 (upholding Florida’s ban on adoption by lesbians, 
gay men, and bisexuals). Recently, in both California and Connecticut, state supreme courts have 
determined that sexual orientation-based classifications warrant heightened scrutiny. See In re 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, No. 
17716, 2008 WL 4530885, at *13 (Conn. Oct. 28, 2008). 
 15.  See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 321 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“There is simply no reason why a 
statute that tells able-bodied police officers . . . that they no longer have the right to earn a living [as 
officers] merely because they are 50 years old should be judged by the same minimal standards of 
rationality that we use to test economic legislation that discriminates against business interests.”); 
Heller, 509 U.S. at 336–37 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he distinctions wrought by the Kentucky 
scheme cannot survive even that rational-basis scrutiny, requiring a rational relationship between 
the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose, which we have previously 
applied to a classification on the basis of mental disability.”); Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1291 (Barkett, J., 
dissenting) (“The ban on homosexual adoption at issue here violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment because Florida’s proffered rational basis is expressly refuted by the 
state’s own law and practice and because a class consisting of all homosexual citizens was targeted 
solely on the basis of impermissible animus.”). 
 16. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 318–19 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 17. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977). 
 18.  See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004); 
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term––Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1972); Jeffrey M. 
Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 161, 163–65 (1984); G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV. 1 
(2005); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term––Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977). 
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“dismissed out of hand.”19 
Notably, Iowa has long been sensitive to the problems of inconsistency 
and inadequacy associated with weak review of government-imposed 
inequalities. In its very first case, the Iowa Supreme Court recognized a 
former slave’s right to personhood while the federal jurisprudence took the 
opposite position.20 Several decades later, the Iowa court again embraced a 
more robust understanding of equality than the federal courts when it 
rejected segregation in passenger trains, which the U.S. Supreme Court, by 
contrast, sustained as permissible twenty-three years later in the notorious 
Plessy v. Ferguson decision.21 
More recently, and in a much different context, the Iowa high court 
broke from the federal approach yet again, insisting on robust review of a 
“non-suspect” classification.22 The U.S. Supreme Court had heard an Iowa 
case involving a challenge to a law that taxed raceways but not riverboat 
casinos, and found no federal equal protection problem with the state’s 
raceway/casino distinction.23 On remand, however, the Iowa Supreme Court 
determined that it could not meaningfully enforce the Iowa constitution’s 
equality guarantees24 if it followed the federal approach.25 Explaining that 
“all legislation” must be subject to “meaningful review,” the state high court 
then conducted a careful review and rejected the very classification that 
 
 19. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Unenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1216 (1978). 
 20.  Compare In re Ralph, Morris 1 (Iowa 1839) (abolishing slavery in Iowa) with Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (upholding slavery under the U.S. Constitution). 
 21.  Compare Coger v. The N. W. Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145, 154–55 (Iowa 1873) 
(invalidating the use of segregated facilities on passenger trains under the Iowa Constitution) with 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding segregation in passenger cars under the Federal 
Constitution). Indeed, even prior to Plessy, the U.S. Supreme Court had demonstrated its divergent 
approach to equality analysis, holding that racial segregation was not an injury within the meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and that Congress lacked the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to create a remedy for claimed injuries. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 22. Compare Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa (RACI I), 539 U.S. 103 (2003) with 
Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald (RACI II), 675 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2004).  
 23.  In sustaining the classification, the Court explained that 
The Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason 
for the classification, the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently 
based rationally may have been considered to be true by the governmental 
decisionmaker, and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated 
as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. 
RACI I, 539 U.S. at 107 (internal citations omitted). 
 24.  IOWA CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 6. 
 25.  RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 9 (discussing Iowa’s “constitutional obligation to safeguard 
constitutional values by ensuring all legislation complies with those values”) (emphasis in original, 
internal citations omitted). 
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survived federal equal protection review.26  
In deciding the tax case, the Iowa court focused not only on the 
specifics of distinguishing between raceways and riverboats but more 
generally on the relationship between state and federal equal protection 
review. Iowa and federal equality guarantees, it observed, sometimes 
“warrant divergent analyses.”27 The court reinforced this point in several 
subsequent cases addressing issues ranging from zoning in college towns28 
to parental rights in state-initiated adoption proceedings.29  
Consequently, when the marriage lawsuit was filed in Iowa, not only 
did it join in an already vigorous public debate about the value of marriage 
and the rights of same-sex couples, but it also entered a lively 
jurisprudential deliberation about how best to ensure meaningful equal 
protection review under the Iowa Constitution.30 In particular, although the 
Iowa high court has committed itself to robust review in several recent 
cases, it has not yet committed expressly to applying meaningful equality 
review in all equal protection challenges. 
The question of how the court will conduct equal protection review 
has, in turn, important ramifications for the future of equality in Iowa. If the 
state were to adopt the “toothless” approach it condemned in RACI II in its 
review of the marriage law’s distinction between same- and different-sex 
couples,31 the plaintiffs would face a more difficult (though not 
insurmountable) burden in proving the impermissibility of the different 
marriage rules for same- and different-sex couples.32  
 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at 5; see also In re Det. of Hennings, 744 N.W.2d 333, 338–39 (Iowa 2008) (citing 
RACI II for the proposition that Iowa equal protection analysis may diverge from federal equal 
protection analysis); Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 817 (Iowa 2005) (same). 
 28. Ames Rental Prop. Ass’n v. City of Ames, 736 N.W.2d 255, 258–59 (Iowa 2007). 
 29. In re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Iowa 2004). 
 30.  For example, the Court’s decision in RACI II led former Iowa Governor Thomas J. 
Vilsack to remark that it is “fairly clear . . . that Iowa's supreme court is prepared to create a whole 
different structure of equal protection under the state constitution which may not necessarily be the 
same as under the federal Constitution.” Thomas J. Vilsack, Reflections of a Participant on 
American Democracy and the Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 887, 891 (2007). 
 31. The statute challenged in Varnum declares that “[o]nly a marriage between a male and a 
female is valid.” Iowa Code § 595.2(1) (2001). 
 32.  See supra note 23. The plaintiffs and amici contended that the marriage law’s 
classification violated even the weakest form of equal protection review. See Proof Brief of 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Varnum v. Brien, No. 07-1499 (Iowa, filed Mar. 28, 2008), available at 
http://data.lambdalegal.org/pdf/legal/varnum/lambda-legal-proof-brief-of-plaintiffs-appellees-iowa-
supreme-court.pdf; infra Part IV of the accompanying amicus brief. The point here is thus not that 
robust equality review is necessary for the plaintiffs to prevail but rather that meaningful review 
would more starkly highlight the absence of a legitimate justification for the distinction between 
same- and different-sex couples. 
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In addressing the proper equal protection analytic framework to carry 
out the Iowa Constitution’s equal protection guarantees, the amicus brief 
that follows argues that the state cannot continue to exclude same-sex 
couples from marriage without a “credible” and “realistically conceivable” 
justification.33 The “purely superficial”34 review that is typical of the federal 
approach should not be applied. The brief argues, further, that with 
meaningful review, none of the state’s interests—whether in responsible 
procreation, resource conservation, or promoting the integrity of “traditional 
marriage”—provide a legitimate explanation for the state’s restricting 
marriage to different-sex couples.35 
Returning now to the point made at the outset, we can see that while 
law reform litigation can have a transformative effect on the public debate 
and on the legal issue before the court, we miss an important measure of the 
litigation’s transformative potential if we limit our focus to those frames. 
Instead, as Iowa marriage litigation illustrates, challenges to a government’s 
line-drawing between groups of people can prompt broad and profound 
questions about a legal system’s commitment to enforcing its own equality 
guarantees. In raising these questions, lawsuits like Varnum thus offer an 
important opportunity not only to ensure meaningful equality in the case 
before the court, but also to ensure a meaningful approach to equality claims 
in the state’s jurisprudence as a whole. 
*               *               * 
INTEREST OF AMICI 
Professors Robert C. Hunter, Jean C. Love, and Maura Strassberg, 
(collectively “Amici”) are constitutional law scholars who have taught or 
currently teach constitutional law in Iowa. They have individual expertise 
relating to both the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution. 
They have substantial expertise relating to both Iowa and federal 
constitutional law. Their expertise enables Amici to evaluate tiered equal 
protection analysis in a manner that will supplement rather than duplicate 
the arguments presented by the parties. In their independent analysis, Amici 
conclude that tiered equal protection analysis is not in keeping with Iowa’s 
equal protection jurisprudence as developed by this Court under the Iowa 
Constitution. 
 
 33.  See infra Part II.B of the accompanying amicus brief; RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 7 & n.3. 
 34.  See infra Part II.B of the accompanying amicus brief; RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 7 & n.3. 
 35.  For development of the reasoning on this point, see infra Part III of the accompanying 
amicus brief. 
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INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Iowa has a robust equal protection jurisprudence centered on a fact-
based, context-sensitive review of all classifications. This review requires a 
“realistic” comparison between the proffered state interest and the burden 
placed on individuals by the challenged classification, as this Court has 
repeatedly affirmed. See, e.g., Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 
N.W.2d 1, 7 n.3 (Iowa 2004) (hereinafter RACI II); In re A.W., 741 N.W.2d 
793, 812 (Iowa 2007). 
By contrast, the federal tiered approach to equal protection review is 
far less consistent and careful. As detailed below, the tiered framework’s 
variable application often fails to provide clear, meaningful review, 
especially when claims are subjected to weak rational basis review. RACI II, 
675 N.W.2d at 8 n.3 (describing federal equal protection analysis as, at 
times, “superficial”). 
Amici argue, therefore, that this Court should explicitly embrace, as it 
has implicitly done in the past, a context-sensitive analysis of all 
classifications, including the one at issue in this case. This approach 
requires the Court to weigh the state’s interests in excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage against the serious burden imposed on those couples 
and their children through the exclusionary classification. Ultimately, as 
Amici show, fact-sensitive review that is consistent with Iowa’s 
longstanding approach to equal protection analysis requires invalidation of 
the challenged marriage classification. 
ARGUMENT 
The case before this Court presents the very situation where Iowa and 
federal equal protection law “warrant divergent analyses” because they 
differ in “scope, import, [and] purpose.” RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 5. Unlike 
the federal guarantee, which has been construed to require three distinct 
tiers of equal protection review, Iowa’s equal protection jurisprudence turns, 
in all cases, on the relative consideration of the burden on an individual’s 
rights and the state’s interests. Compare Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 
(1993) (affording a “strong presumption of validity” to classifications 
considered under rational basis review) with RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 9 
(asserting that “all legislation” must be subject to thorough, “meaningful 
review” (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)). In analyzing equal 
protection claims, including the claim in the instant case––that Iowa’s 
marriage law severely burdens the plaintiffs without adequate justification 
from the state––application of a context-sensitive, balancing approach, 
rather than tiered review, would be truest to Iowa’s constitutional values.
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I. IOWA HAS A ROBUST TRADITION OF EQUALITY THAT 
CALLS FOR INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS TO 
ADEQUATELY PROTECT INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS. 
Since the state’s founding, Iowa has been strongly committed to 
treating its citizens equally and to protecting their individual rights and 
liberties.1 To hold these values paramount, this Court has, when necessary, 
departed from the rigid federal framework and engaged in its own, 
independent equal protection analysis.  
A. Iowa Departs from the Federal Government’s Approach to 
Equal Protection When Doing So Is In Keeping With 
Iowa’s Robust Tradition of Equality. 
This Court recognizes that its “constitutional obligations” could require 
it to “employ a different analytical framework” than that used by federal 
courts to insure meaningful enforcement of the Iowa Constitution’s equal 
protection guarantees. RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 4-5; see also In re Det. of 
Hennings, 744 N.W.2d 333, 338-39 (Iowa 2008) (citing RACI II for the 
proposition that Iowa equal protection analysis may diverge from federal 
equal protection analysis); Ames Rental Prop. Ass’n v. City of Ames, 736 
N.W.2d 255, 258-59 (Iowa 2007) (same); State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 
264, 277 (Iowa 2006) (same); Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 817 (Iowa 
2005) (same); In re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Iowa 2004) (same). 
Principles of state sovereignty, which encourage states to actively 
protect individual rights, reinforce the Court’s inclination to adopt its own 
standard. As Justice Brennan observed, state courts can and should interpret 
their constitutions independent of federal jurisprudence to insure full 
protection of individual rights.  
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens 
the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, 
too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often 
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of federal law . . . [F]ederal law . . . must not be 
allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law—
 
 1. Iowa’s commitment to equality finds explicit support in two clauses of Iowa’s 
constitution. Article I § 1 provides, “All men and women are, by nature, free and equal, and have 
certain inalienable rights among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, 
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.” 
Similarly, Article I § 6 states, “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the 
general assembly shall not grant any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, 
upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.” 
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for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be 
guaranteed. 
William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977) (hereinafter Brennan). Endorsing 
Justice Brennan’s reinforcement of state sovereignty in constitutional 
interpretation, several state supreme courts have found their respective state 
constitutions to guarantee individual rights beyond the protections of the 
U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Dow v. New Haven Independent, Inc., 549 A.2d 
683, 689 (Conn. 1987) (relying on state sovereignty principles as a basis for 
affirming stronger state protection for freedom of the press); State v. 
Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 597 (Wis. 2005) (setting an independent state test 
for assessing whether out-of-court identifications violate due process); 
LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. 1986) (invoking Brennan’s 
view of state sovereignty to support stronger state protections than federal 
protections for the right of access to courts).  
Indeed, this Court highlighted the value of independent state 
constitutional analysis when it recognized, in RACI II, that state courts 
regularly depart from federal jurisprudence when interpreting their own 
constitutions. RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 6 (“‘Examples abound where state 
courts have independently considered the merits of constitutional arguments 
and declined to follow opinions of the United States Supreme Court.’” 
(quoting Brennan)). 
 
B. Iowa’s Jurisprudence Secures Stronger Equality 
Protections than does Federal Equal Protection Law. 
Iowa’s willingness to depart from the tiered federal analytical 
framework is in line with its history of providing broader protections under 
state equality provisions than those secured by the Federal Constitution.  
The Court’s decision in RACI II provides the most recent and direct 
example of Iowa’s broader protection of equality. The U.S. Supreme Court 
sustained the Iowa law at issue against a federal equal protection challenge, 
finding no constitutional violation in a statute that taxed raceways but not 
riverboat casinos. Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103 
(2003). Yet on remand, this Court applied Iowa’s own equal protection law 
and struck down the very same classification. RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 16. 
The Iowa Supreme Court’s commitment to broader equality protection 
began much earlier, when it decided its very first case. See In re Ralph, 
Morris 1 (Iowa 1839). In that case, the Court recognized a former slave’s 
right to personhood at a time when federal jurisprudence took the contrary 
position. Contrast In re Ralph, Morris 1, 7 (Iowa 1839) (rejecting attempts 
by a Missouri slave owner to have Ralph, a former slave, forcibly returned 
 Equality Opportunity 117 
to Missouri) with Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (upholding a 
Missouri slave owner’s right to have Dred Scott treated as property and 
returned to him, and finding that Scott’s residence outside Missouri did not 
emancipate him) and M’Cutchen v. Marshall, 33 U.S. 220 (1834) (treating 
slaves as property to be bequeathed or freed in accordance to the owner’s 
will). 
Grounding its analysis in Iowa’s independent constitutional guarantees, 
the Court in In re Ralph affirmed the wide-reaching and fundamental 
principle that all persons are to be treated equally under the law. The Court 
held that where an action “illegally restrains a human being of his liberty, it 
is proper that the laws, which should extend equal protection to [persons] of 
all colors and conditions, should exert their remedial interposition.” In re 
Ralph, Morris at 7.  
Similarly, when this Court invalidated the use of segregated facilities 
on passenger trains, it expressly relied on “the broad and just ground of the 
equality of all [persons] before the law which is not limited by color, 
nationality, religion or condition in life.” Coger v. Nw. Union Packing Co., 
37 Iowa 145, 154 (Iowa 1873). Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) 
(upholding racially segregated public accommodations), overruled by 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In addition, for almost a 
century, this Court’s interpretation of Iowa’s constitution in Clark v. Board 
of Directors secured equal protection for racial minority school children 
where federal jurisprudence did not. 24 Iowa 266 (1868) (invalidating racial 
segregation in public schools). Cf. Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (ordering public 
schools to desegregate). 
More recently, in RACI II, 675 N.W.2d, as well as in Bierkamp v. 
Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577 (Iowa 1980), the Court affirmed that its 
commitment to a broad equal protection guarantee extends beyond racial 
classifications. In Bierkamp, this Court found that Iowa’s equality 
protections required a departure from federal equality jurisprudence when it 
struck down a statute that limited a driver’s liability for injuries to 
passengers. 293 N.W.2d at 578. The U.S. Supreme Court, by contrast, found 
an analogous state statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Silver 
v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929).2 In Bierkamp, as in RACI II and numerous 
other cases, this Court insured that all Iowans are treated equally in all 
aspects of their lives, providing protections beyond the limited guarantees of 
federal equal protection. 
 
 2. The United States Supreme Court has on numerous appeals declined to reconsider this 
issue for want of a substantial federal question. See, e.g., Hill v. Garner, 434 U.S. 989, dismissing 
appeal from 561 P.2d 1016 (Or. 1977); White v. Hughes, 423 U.S. 805, dismissing appeal from 519 
S.W.2d 70 (Ark. 1975); Cannon v. Oviatt, 419 U.S. 810, dismissing appeal from 520 P.2d 883 
(Utah 1974). As this Court recognized in Bierkamp, these U.S. Supreme Court decisions were 
binding on both state and federal courts and thus effectively foreclosed courts from considering the 
issue on federal constitutional grounds. Bierkamp, 293 N.W.2d at 579. 
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II. A CONTEXT-SENSITIVE BALANCING APPROACH IS 
THE BEST WAY TO PROVIDE THE MEANINGFUL 
JUDICIAL REVIEW NECESSARY TO SECURE THE 
BROAD RANGE OF RIGHTS PROTECTED BY IOWA’S 
CONSTITUTION. 
This Court’s equal protection jurisprudence reflects a context-sensitive 
balancing analysis. Explicit adoption of that approach here, as distinct from 
the inflexible and often inadequate federal tiered framework, will better 
facilitate full and careful consideration of Iowa’s core constitutional 
concerns in assessing equal protection claims.  
Chief among the concerns reflected in this Court’s decisions are: (1) 
the importance of the state interest proffered to justify the challenged 
classification, including whether the stated goals are “permissible” and 
“realistic,” RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 9, and (2) the significance of the right or 
privilege at stake and the degree of harm to the individual burdened, 
including the degree to which the challenged classification is over- or 
under-inclusive. See, e.g., RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 10 (citing Bierkamp, 293 
N.W.2d at 584); In re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d at 651. These factors are 
important in all equal protection determinations, and applying a balancing 
approach that values substance over formula better enables the Court to 
consider them. 
A. Tiered Equal Protection Analysis Fails to Provide the 
Meaningful Review Required by the Iowa Constitution. 
The federal framework of tiered analysis does not provide an adequate 
mechanism for reviewing Iowa equal protection claims for several reasons. 
First, as the Court recognized in RACI II, the federal application of 
tiered equal protection analysis is not sufficiently rigorous to meet the 
requirements of the Iowa Constitution. In disagreeing with the U.S. 
Supreme Court regarding the tax classification at issue in that case, this 
Court found federal rational basis review inadequate because it permitted 
the U.S. Supreme Court to sustain the classification, even though the state 
offered “no explanation of or justification for” the statutory distinction 
between raceways and riverboat casinos. RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 13 n.6. 
The Court recognized this shortcoming as indicating a larger problem in that 
many cases subject to rational basis review are “dismissed out of hand.” Id. 
at 13 n.5 (citing Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Unenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1216 (1978)). 
This assessment of rationality review’s flaw is consistent with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s own observation that rational basis review does not require 
a legislature to “articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its 
classification.” Heller, 509 U.S. at 320. As this Court explained, the often 
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“toothless” tiered review used for enforcing the federal equal protection 
guarantee cannot substitute for a more thorough assessment under the Iowa 
Constitution. See RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 9.  
Second, this Court has emphasized that “all legislation” challenged on 
equality grounds must be subject to thorough, meaningful review. RACI II, 
675 N.W.2d at 9 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Yet the very 
purpose of tiered analysis is to differentiate among equal protection claims 
based solely upon the nature of the classification. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. 
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000) (“[W]hen conducting rational basis 
review we will not overturn such government action unless the varying 
treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement 
of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that 
the government’s actions were irrational. In contrast, when a State 
discriminates on the basis of race or gender, we require a tighter fit between 
the discriminatory means and the legitimate ends they serve.” (internal 
quotations and citations omitted)).  
Through these categorical distinctions, tiered analysis creates a large 
gap between rigorous strict scrutiny and strongly deferential rational basis 
review. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 481, 491 (2004) (arguing that “a unitary standard would potentially 
narrow the gap between the virtually assured fatal blow dealt to 
classifications under strict scrutiny and the rubber stamp regularly received 
by classifications subject to rational basis review”). Under tiered analysis, 
strict scrutiny applies only to claims based on race or national origin and is 
almost always fatal. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) 
(describing racial classifications as “constitutionally suspect” and subject to 
“the most rigid scrutiny”). Intermediate scrutiny, which is applied to sex- 
and illegitimacy-based classifications, is likewise an imposing standard. 
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 545 (1996) (striking down 
sex-based school admissions rule because it could not be supported by an 
“important governmental objective” that was “substantially related” to the 
challenged classification). 
By contrast, rational basis review, which applies to the overwhelming 
majority of classifications, provides the weakest form of review. See Jeffrey 
M. Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation: Illusion and Reality 90 (2001) 
(explaining that rational basis “scrutiny that was supposed to be minimal in 
theory turned out to be nonexistent in practice”); FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 
508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (asserting that under rational basis review, “a 
legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be . . . 
unsupported by evidence or empirical data”). In short, the variable quality 
of review under the tiered approach cuts precisely against this Court’s 
commitment to meaningful review across the board. 
Third, even the three tiers themselves are not applied consistently, 
leading both U.S. Supreme Court Justices and the courts of other states to 
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observe that the mechanistic framework interferes with meaningful 
analysis.3 As then-Justice Rehnquist stated, federal equal protection 
jurisprudence can be read as amounting to “a series of conclusions 
unsupported by any central guiding principle.” Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 
762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall similarly 
condemned the tiered framework’s unpredictability for its failure to provide 
notice to interested parties or guidance to judges in future cases. Mass. Bd. 
of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Picking up on these concerns, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the 
use of tiers in its own equal protection analysis, asserting that “[m]echanical 
approaches to the delicate problem of judicial intervention . . . divert a court 
from the meritorious issue,” Right to Choose v. Bryne, 450 A.2d 925, 936 
(N.J. 1982) (internal quotations omitted), and “prevent[] a full 
understanding of the clash between individual and governmental interests.” 
Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 632 (N.J. 
2000).  
B. When Evaluating Equal Protection Claims, the Court has 
Given, and Should Continue to Give in This Case, 
Context-Sensitive Consideration to the State’s and the 
Burdened Party’s Interests, Rather than Applying 
Mechanical Tiered Review.  
Given the tiered framework’s flaws, this Court should, as it has in the 
past, meaningfully compare the state’s interests and the burdens placed on 
individuals,4 rather than simply validating any “reasonably conceivable” 
 
 3.  Although the United States Supreme Court has occasionally applied what can be 
considered a stronger analysis under rational basis review, see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996) (considering a classification based on sexual orientation); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (reviewing differential treatment based on mental retardation), 
this Court's jurisprudence suggests that meaningful, contextual review should be applied not just 
occasionally but consistently in all cases. RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 10. See also Goldberg, 77 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. at 514-16 (describing and critiquing the U.S. Supreme Court’s inconsistent application of 
searching rational basis review) 
Faced with a similar problem, the Vermont Supreme Court recognized that occasional divergence in 
favor of more searching review in some cases is insufficient and rejected the tiered framework, 
adopting a balancing approach to equal protection analysis. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 872-73 
(1999). 
 
 4. Other states have similarly abandoned tiered review for an approach that focuses on the 
burdening of individual rights as compared to the state’s interest in the challenged classification. See 
State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1192-93 (Alaska 1983) (“The applicable standard of review for a 
given [equal protection] case is to be determined by the importance of the individual rights asserted 
and by the degree of suspicion with which we view the resulting classification scheme.”); 
Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 302 (N.J. 1985) (When deciding equal protection claims, 
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explanation for a classification subject to rational basis review. Contrast 
RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 7 n.3 with Heller, 509 U.S. at 320. 
This comparison, as explained by the Court in past cases, requires that 
the government provide “reasons justifying a particular classification” that 
are “credible” and “realistically conceivable.”5 RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 7 & 
n.3 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original); see 
also Ames, 736 N.W.2d at 260; In re A.W., 741 N.W.2d at 812; Sanchez, 
692 N.W.2d at 818. In contrast, tiered equal protection review requires 
plaintiffs to rebut “every conceivable” government interest. Heller, 509 U.S 
at 320 (emphasis added). By insisting on realistic justifications and rejecting 
the “purely superficial analysis” fostered by tiered review, this Court’s 
contextual approach has enabled meaningful enforcement of Iowa’s equality 
guarantees. RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 7 n.3. 
This Court’s decision in Ames Rental Property Ass’n v. City of Ames, 
736 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 2007), for example, illustrates this context-specific 
analysis of the interests at stake. The case upheld a zoning ordinance 
restricting the ability of unrelated persons to live together in single family 
zones. Id. at 259. After careful consideration, the Court determined that the 
plaintiffs’ evidence did not sufficiently show that the residency requirement 
posed an unreasonable burden on housing arrangements. By way of 
example, the plaintiffs had argued that the classification violated the state’s 
equal protection guarantee because “a fifteen-member family could live in a 
tiny one-bedroom house with fifteen cars parked in the streets and 
driveways, while four unrelated people cannot live in a fifteen bedroom 
house with no cars at all.” Id. at 261 n.5. The Court found that this and the 
other examples provided were not “typical of reality,” and therefore were 
unpersuasive. Id. at 261 nn.4-5. The Court counseled that establishing a 
burden sufficient to violate equal protection “requires more than imagining 
extreme examples.” Id. at 260. As the Ames holding demonstrates, the 
context-specific approach did not pre-determine the case in favor of either 
party, but instead supported meaningful review of both parties’ positions. 
Under this current approach, the Court likewise gives careful review to 
the legitimacy and factual basis of the government’s interests. In Ames, the 
Court’s contextual analysis considered the unique situation of Ames as a 
 
the New Jersey Supreme Court considers “the nature of the affected right, the extent to which the 
governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the restriction.”). 
 5. Once again, Iowa is not alone in developing a state-specific, context-sensitive equal 
protection test emphasizing the need for government interests to have a factual basis. The Alaska 
Supreme Court requires the connection between the government interest and the classification to be 
“substantial,” Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 791 (Alaska 2005), which can be 
deduced through a “less speculative, less deferential means-to-ends inquiry.” Id. at 791 n.48 
(quotations omitted). Vermont has adopted a similar requirement. Baker, 744 A.2d at 872 
(“Vermont courts . . . engage in a meaningful, case-specific analysis to insure that any exclusion 
from the general benefit and protection of the law would bear a just and reasonable relation to the 
legislative goal.”). 
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college town, Id. at 261 & n.6, and the government’s reliance on existing 
experience in managing the effect of student populations on the broader 
community. Id. at 261. The Court also recognized the legislature’s 
conscious attempt to minimize burdens through the law’s “flexible and 
expansive” definition of “family.” Id. at 262. While traditional rational basis 
review might have led the Court to the same conclusion as this balancing 
approach produced, it would have bypassed the careful, fact-based review 
required in Iowa’s constitutional jurisprudence. 
This Court conducted a similar contextual analysis in In re A.W., 741 
N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 2007), when it considered a challenge to the state Indian 
Child Welfare Act’s classification of “Indian children.” Unlike the federal 
law, which limited “Indian children” to members of a federally recognized 
tribe, the state law included all ethnic Indian children within its scope. Id. at 
799. The Court first found that the federal government had not delegated 
authority to the state legislature to expand the federal definition. Id. at 810-
11. The Court then added that it had an “axiomatic” duty to consider 
whether Iowa’s definition of “Indian children” violated the state equal 
protection guarantees, even assuming the legislature had had authority to 
regulate in this area. Id. at 808. In conducting its equal protection analysis, 
this Court carefully weighed the state’s interests and the burdens placed on 
affected children. Id. at 808 n.12. While the Court found the legislature’s 
goal of preserving Indian tribes “laudatory,” Id. at 810, it also held that this 
interest was not served by the classification because the children at issue 
had no relationship with “the reservation or traditional [tribal] society.” Id. 
at 812. Comparing the stated goal, which was not served by the 
classification, to the severe burden placed on children through prolonged 
proceedings to terminate parental rights, the Court concluded that the 
classification violated the state equal protection guarantee. Id. at 812. 
As a part of a context-sensitive, fact-based analysis in all equal 
protection challenges, this Court also insists in all cases––and should insist 
here––that a reasonable fit exist between classifications and their 
justifications. RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 10 (citing Bierkamp, 293 N.W.2d at 
584) (establishing that “as a classification involves extreme degrees of 
overinclusion and underinclusion . . . it cannot be said to reasonably further 
[the legislative] goal”); see also Ames, 736 N.W.2d at 260 (using the 
reasonable fit requirement to review the constitutionality of a zoning 
statute); Claude v. Guarantee Nat’l Ins. Co., 679 N.W.2d 659, 665 (Iowa 
2004) (invoking the reasonable fit requirement in assessing the validity of 
legislation distinguishing between hit-and-run and miss-and-run drivers); In 
re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d at 651 (applying the reasonable fit requirement in 
reviewing a statutory classification distinguishing between indigent parents 
in state-initiated proceedings and in private party adoptions). 
This approach again contrasts with federal tiered review, which 
typically takes issue with a statute’s precision only when applying 
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heightened review. See Bierkamp, 293 N.W.2d at 584 (citing McGinnis v. 
Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973)). As the Court established in Bierkamp, the 
Iowa Supreme Court’s evaluation of a classification’s over- or under-
inclusivity in all cases “necessarily merges the standards applicable under 
the [] tiered approach.” Bierkamp, 293 N.W.2d at 584. 
In re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d 645 (Iowa 2004), provides a particularly 
strong example of the Court’s attention to the need for a reasonable fit 
between the classification and the legislative goal. The Court considered a 
law that provided counsel to indigent parents in state-initiated parental 
rights termination proceedings, but not in private party adoption 
proceedings that also involved terminating parental rights. In re S.A.J.B., 
679 N.W.2d at 647-48. The Court rejected the state’s argument that the 
classification was reasonably related to the state’s interest, which the state 
defined as insuring counsel only when the state was an active participant. Id. 
at 650. Focusing on the statute’s realistic effect, the Court found the 
differing state role in the two situations did not alter the analysis where the 
burden on the plaintiff, possible termination of the parent-child relationship, 
remained the same. Id. 
In all of the cases just discussed, the Court considered vastly different 
laws and circumstances, and in each, conducted a thorough, fact-based 
review. With a consistently focused inquiry across a range of classifications, 
the Court carefully compared the facts marshaled by both sides, weighed the 
importance of the government’s interest and the burden placed on individual 
rights, and reached a determination based upon an assessment of these 
considerations. By applying this balancing approach to the case at bar, the 
Court will continue its past practice and will be well-situated to give effect 
to the constitutional values that have long grounded Iowa’s equal protection 
analysis. 
III. BALANCING THE STATE’S INTERESTS IN THE 
MARRIAGE CLASSIFICATION AGAINST THE BURDEN 
ON THE COUPLES EXCLUDED FROM MARRIAGE 
DEMONSTRATES THAT IOWA’S MARRIAGE STATUTE 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Iowa’s equality jurisprudence, as described above, requires the Court in 
this case to evaluate the numerous burdens same-sex couples face on 
account of the statutory declaration that “[o]nly a marriage between a male 
and a female is valid.” Iowa Code § 595.2(1) (2007). It must then weigh 
these burdens against the state’s asserted interest in excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage and consider whether a sufficient fit exists between 
the challenged classification and the proffered government interests.  
As the parties and Amici have briefed at length, the state’s marriage 
law creates a status of fundamental importance and provides different-sex 
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couples access to a wide array of benefits, both tangible and dignitary; yet 
this status and its associated benefits are unavailable to same-sex couples. 
Trial Judgment p. 22, ¶¶ 33-35 (classifying these as material facts as to 
which there is no genuine issue). 
Keeping in mind the significant burden that flows from the denial of an 
important right, Iowa’s equal protection jurisprudence requires that the 
Court also consider the state’s interest in retaining the exclusion. Here, the 
state seeks to justify imposing this burden as necessary to serve three goals: 
encouraging responsible procreation by heterosexuals, enabling 
conservation of state resources, and promoting the integrity of “traditional 
marriage.” Trial Judgment p. 51. 
Consistent with this Court’s approach to equal protection, the core 
question in this case is whether the state’s proffered interests in the 
challenged classification are sufficiently “credible” and “realistically 
conceivable” to justify depriving plaintiffs of a profoundly important set of 
rights and benefits. The lower court undertook this inquiry and found that 
the state’s interests lack the factual grounding to support the classification 
challenged here. Trial Judgment p. 48-49, 55-56, 61.  
More specifically, an interest in responsible procreation cannot explain 
the different treatment of same- and different-sex couples. As the lower 
court recognized, “by excluding all same-sex couples from marriage, the 
statute actually defeats the purpose of responsible procreation by excluding 
qualified individuals from marriage.” Trial Judgment p. 58. In addition, both 
types of couples have and raise children, and the state’s law makes no 
suggestion that sexual orientation is relevant to parenting ability. Trial 
Judgment p. 55 (“Defendant admits that nothing about a parent’s sex or 
sexual orientation affects either that parent’s capacity to be a good parent or 
a child’s healthy development.”); see also In re Marriage of Cupples, 531 
N.W.2d 656, 657 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (finding sexual orientation a 
“nonissue” for custody determinations). 
Moreover, no facts support the state’s assertion that excluding same-
sex couples from marriage serves the proffered interest in resource 
conservation. Trial Judgment p. 60-61. Instead, that reason, like the fifteen-
car argument made in Ames, is not sufficiently “typical of reality” to be 
persuasive. 
The state’s third proffered interest—the promotion of the integrity of 
“traditional marriage”—is likewise unavailing. In fact, the lack of any 
realistic, factual basis is illustrated by this interest’s failure to withstand 
even ordinary rational basis review. The lower court, while applying 
traditional rational basis review, found this aim to be discriminatory and 
illegitimate. The court understood that a desire to promote “traditional 
marriage” “means simply that one wishes to exclude same-sex couples from 
entering that union because that is the way things always have been” and 
firmly rejected this logic. Trial Judgment p. 51-53. Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. 
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v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“[I]f the constitutional conception of 
‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean 
that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
Thus, the state’s marital exclusion cannot survive an equal protection 
analysis that directly weighs the serious burdens imposed upon the plaintiff 
couples against the state’s proffered interests, which lack factual or logical 
support.  
IV. IOWA’S MARRIAGE LAW VIOLATES THE LITERAL 
TERMS OF IOWA’S EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEE, 
AND MUST BE INVALIDATED EVEN IF A BALANCING 
TEST IS NOT APPLIED. 
Even if the Court does not adopt a balancing approach to equal 
protection analysis, a traditional tiered approach is not called for in this 
case. The challenged law imposes a burden on same-sex couples so 
substantial that it “is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the 
most literal sense.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that this type of literal 
violation of the terms of equal protection, though rare, can and should be 
invalidated even without applying the traditional tiered framework of 
federal jurisprudence. In Romer, the U.S. Supreme Court considered an 
amendment to Colorado’s constitution that barred anti-discrimination 
protections for gay people in the state. Id. Because the measure precluded 
the state from providing “the protection of equal laws” to lesbians, gay men, 
and bisexuals, the Court declared the distinction to be unconstitutional in an 
analysis separate from its traditional rational basis review. Id. at 634. As the 
Court explained, the amendment was, by definition, improper because it had 
the “peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on 
a single named group.” Id. at 632. 
Like the amendment invalidated in Romer, Iowa’s marriage law draws 
a line that authorizes the state to provide protection—in the form of 
relationship recognition—to one group of Iowans but not to another. By 
limiting marriage to unions between men and women, Iowa Code § 595.2(1) 
(2007), the challenged statute excludes same-sex couples from accessing the 
protection provided by the state for adult interdependent relationships. Put 
another way, the marriage law bars same-sex couples from obtaining the 
legal status that grants relationship protection, which is made available to all 
other Iowans. Acceptance of this law would contradict the history and 
purpose of Iowa’s Constitution, see Part I infra, and amount to an 
abandonment of Iowa’s commitment to equality. 
This Court has voiced an ongoing concern with legislation that renders 
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a person outside of the law. See, e.g., In re Ralph, Morris 1 (Iowa 1839); In 
re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d 645 (Iowa 2004). Cf. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 
(finding it fundamental that a “State cannot [] deem a class of persons a 
stranger to its laws”). Iowa’s marriage law imposes exactly this kind of 
exclusion and amounts to a per se denial of equal access to the law. 
Consequently, as Romer suggests, this Court can invalidate Iowa’s 
exclusionary marriage law on its face, without the need for either tiered or 
balancing analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Amici respectfully request that this Court 
apply a context-sensitive balancing approach to insure meaningful 
enforcement of Iowa’s equality guarantees, and invalidate Iowa’s exclusion 
of same-sex couples from marriage.  
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